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, there are at least 10 million environmental refugees today (roughly half of them in Sub-Saharan Africa), compared with 17 million other refugees (e.g., political, religious, and ethnic) combined. The first figure is certainly on the low side, because governments generally take little official account of this unconventional category of refugees; it is the unrecognized refugees that have shown most increase in recent years until they may now number (roughly estimated) as many as 25 million. Even if we accept a total of only 10 million recognized environmental refugees today, cautious and conservative as the figure is, we can assume their numbers are likely to swell rapidly as burgeoning throngs of impoverished people press ever harder on overloaded environments (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1990, 1991, Myers 1991 Myers , 1992 . Worse, their numbers may well increase several if not many times by the time that global warming takes hold (Myers 1993 ).
What evidence is there to support the latter prognosis for a greenhouseaffected world? This article presents a preliminary analysis to gain a first-cut understanding of the problem in its full character and extent. Some of the analysis is speculative, and in certain instances there is a range of estimates. Plenty has been written about the impacts of global warming, but little attention has been directed to the emergent issue of environmental refugees, and hardly any detailed work has been done to assess the prospect in comprehensive and systematic terms (for introductory efforts, see Jacobson 1988 , Tickell 1990 Finally, the analysis assumes there will be few protection measures adopted in the form of, for example, sea-wall defenses. True, much could be done to reduce the threat through sea walls, anti-flood levees and dikes, upstream dams, beach nourishment, and other engineering defenses, plus land-use planning to deflect human settlements away from at-risk zones (IPCC 1992b , Titus 1990 , Titus et al. 1991 , USNRC 1987 On top of all these problems stemming from the encroaching sea, there could be trouble for Bangladesh from the opposite side of the country, the Himalayas. The three great rivers pouring into Bangladesh carry exceptionally swollen waters after the monsoon strikes the Himalayas. Their combined outflow is two and a half times that of the Mississippi and surpassed only by that of the Amazon (Topping 1990 ; see also Brammer 1993). Less than one tenth of these rivers' catchments lies within Bangladesh, leaving the country with next to no control over the vast volumes of water pouring into its territory.
In September 1988, river flooding left three-quarters of the country inundated, with 50 million people rendered homeless and $1.5 billion worth of damage (equivalent to 6.5% of GDP or a whole year's economic growth; World Bank 1989); the disaster had nothing to do with waters from the sea. If global warming causes the monsoon system to have a more powerful impact, the rivers' flow into Bangladesh could expand by at least half during the monsoon season (Rasmusson 1989 ). There would also be increased melting of Himalayan glaciers. Indeed, some experts believe the threat from inland flooding may turn out to be more serious than the better-recognized threat from rising sea level (IPCC 1990a, 1992a).
There is yet another problem: increased saltwater intrusions. Already these intrusions can extend seasonally 150 kilometers inland along river courses (Broadus 1993). A relative sea-level rise of one meter would cause such intrusions to reach even further inland, with adverse repercussions for irrigated cultivation of rice and other crops, and for household water supplies.
The main analysis reviewed (Broadus 1993), based largely on effective sea-level rise, is to be deemed a severeoutcome scenario. But a number of additional adverse factors would make it plausible if not probable in many respects.
Egypt
The River Nile supports a 1 0-kilometer-wide strip of farmlands plus the delta plain, totalling 35,000 square kilometers or a mere 3.5% of the nation's territory. In this area live 57 million people today, making for a local population density of approximately 1600 per square kilometer, or more than twice the nationwide density of Bangladesh. Already Egypt has difficulty feeding itself, having to import well over half its food (World Bank 1992b). But in a greenhouseaffected world, it may well be that drier conditions will cause a one-fifth drop in the corn yield and a one-third drop in the wheat yield-a prospect that could be aggravated by a marked decline in the Nile River flow (Gleick 1991). Food shortages are likely to be exacerbated still further by sea-level rise through permanent flooding of prime agricultural lands. Moreover, the area worst affected by sea-level rise, the Nile delta, is experiencing rapid natural subsidence (Stanley 1990 
Other delta areas and coastal lands
All in all, as much as five million square kilometers of coastal lands could be threatened by a one-meter sea-level rise plus storm surges and saltwater intrusions (Hekstra 1990, UNEP 1989). This aggregate area is equivalent to the United States west of the Mississippi, but amounts to only 3% percent of Earth's land surface. Yet, it is home to well over one billion people already, a total projected to rise to at least two billion well before 2050 (it also encompasses one third of the world's croplands and one fifth of market-valued assets; Voigt 1991; see also Wilson 1989 Using these background data, because no better estimate is available at present, it seems appropriate to propose that India's total of flood-zone refugees alone could be anywhere between 20 million and 60 million, with 30 million taken here as a conservative working figure. This estimate is among the roughest advanced in this article. It is adopted on the grounds that the total must be in the low tens of millions. The estimate could ultimately turn out to be too cautious by several tens of millions.
Return to the aggregate area cited for all coastal lands at risk, totaling 5 million square kilometers. The expanse includes those sectors of Bangladesh and Egypt already considered, with a combined total of approximately 30 million potential refugees. Let us suppose that all other areas together, including China and India (30 million each), would generate another 70 million refugees, the additional 10 million refugees occurring in further coastal lands. Plainly, this estimate is rough indeed: it is advanced only with the purpose of enabling us to get to preliminary grips with an issue of major moment. Equally plainly, the figure is conservative.
We Note that the 26 million figure is distinctly conservative from a broader standpoint. The megametropoles considered are located on only 6 of the 19 delta/estuary areas listed. Several of the 13 other areas feature sizable urban communities, though not so large as the 11 conurbations considered. Moreover, the refugee total would be higher yet again if we were to include smaller cities (plus smaller deltas and estuaries). Already, two out of three cities with 2.5 million people are located on coasts (Voigt 1991 ). This analysis serves to affirm as realistic the estimate of 10 million further refugees in additional coastal lands.
Island states
Also at risk are a number of island states such as the Maldives, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Marshalls in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, plus a dozen or more such states in the Caribbean. The first group will be acutely vulnerable to sea-level rise and flooding insofar as virtually their entire territories lie only a meter or two above sea level; several of these islands face the prospect of outright elimination. The collective population of the non-Caribbean island states is 24 million today (Topping 1992), projected to surpass 50 million by 2030. Fortunately, only 1 million people at most are likely to find themselves having to evacuate permanently, though as many as 46 million of the 50 million people could find their homes and livelihoods critically affected (Jacobson 1988) .
The Caribbean island states may eventually become subject to tropical storms of increased intensity over a longer season. These storms may be sufficient to reduce greatly the suitability of parts of the islands for permanent human habitation.
Agricultural dislocations
On top of the problems associated with sea-level rise is the prospect of other global-warming effects, such as shifts in monsoon systems and the arrival of severe and persistent droughts, with all that they would entail for agriculture. A temperature rise of only 1?C, likely by 2050 in terms of most projections, could affect monsoon patterns to an extent that would dwarf the direct drought effects of such a temperature rise (IPCC 1990a). The area most vulnerable to monsoon dislocations is the Indian subcontinent, projected to hold 2.1 billion people by 2050. India relies on the monsoon for 70% of its rainfall (Rasmusson 1989) ; hence, its agriculture is critically dependent on the stable functioning of the monsoon. In broader terms, the entire Asia-Pacific region is exceptionally vulnerable to monsoon-system changes, if only because it contains well over half the world's population today, projected to become a still larger proportion by 2050 (Topping et al. 1991) .
Predicting the effects of drought and its repercussions for agriculture is more uncertain. Climatic quirks are less well predicted through globalclimate models at regional levels than are monsoon patterns, sea-level rise, and cyclone systems. Areas consid-ered susceptible to drought include much of northern Mexico, northern Chile, northeastern Brazil, eastern Argentina, the Mediterranean basin, the Sahel, the southern quarter of Africa, and sectors of the middle and tropical latitudes of Asia, as well as parts of the United States, southern Canada, southern Europe, and Australia (Schneider 1989 ). The latter four areas produce much of the surplus food that sustains more than 100 developing countries today.
According This analysis has been reinforced by a still more recent and much more detailed assessment (Rosenzweig et al. 1993 ). This assessment postulates that global warming will reduce cereal production in developing countries by 9-11% by the year 2060. In conjunction with other factors, such as population growth and increased food prices to reflect scarcity, this reduction could cause a projected expansion of 640 million in the number of hungry people, bringing the enfamished total to 1 billion. The date of The principal agricultural problem is expected to be lack of soil moisture during the growing seasons. In North Africa, for instance, evapotranspiration would increase by 10% for each temperature increase of 1.5?C. Even without any change in rainfall (it is expected to decline), this evapotranspiration would deplete river flows by more than 10%, causing irrigable croplands to contract (IPCC 
Further conceptual dimensions
These estimates of future numbers of environmental refugees are a case of best judgement. They are intended to be exploratory at most. A few of them could be off target by 10 million or even more either way, though more probably on the low side insofar as the analyses are conservative. And even if the overall total were too high by one third, or 50 million people, this refugee problem would still be of altogether unprecedented scale. The totals could also be affected by questions of classification. Although many people will be threatened by environmental factors in a greenhouseaffected world, will they necessarily become obliged to migrate? Or should they better be viewed for the time being as only at risk, especially insofar as ameliorative measures may be deployed to safeguard them? And if they do move, what constitutes true migration? Some people displaced by sealevel rise may need to move their place of residence only a short distance; certain coastal communities may find that residents need simply move across town, albeit a town that may itself be having to move inland with all the further societal traumas that would entail.
Moreover, several of the megametropolises listed may already be experiencing severe problems due to a 50% or greater increase in population size in their recent past (United Nations 1992). This ultrarapid growth may have already overwhelmed the cities' capacity to cope generally, let alone to confront the particular problems of coastal flooding. Equally to the point, people seeking to escape from coastal flooding by moving across town may find there is little room to For instance, in a greenhouse-affected world many agricultural regions look likely to experience higher temperatures and reduced soil moisture, notably the drought-prone sectors of Africa listed above; yet, most of our agricultural crops are finely tuned to present climatic conditions. Hence, there will be need to expand the genetic underpinnings of our crops-a need that will place a premium on germplasm variability to build up, for example, drought resistance. The same need applies to genetic adaptations for crop plants to counter new pests and diseases, such as are likely to thrive in a greenhouseaffected world. Yet, the gene reservoirs of crop plants are being depleted at unprecedentedly rapid rates, to an extent that already leaves our crops dependent on a critically reduced genetic-resource base.
Further, there will be pressure to grow three times as much food as today to take care of increased numbers of people with increased nutritional expectations. Yet, irrigated lands, which currently supply one third of our food from one sixth of our croplands, could experience reduced water flows during peak-demand seasons due to changes in water runoff patterns in the wake of global warming (Frederick and Gleick 1990).
Similarly, there could be synergistic repercussions from diseases (Schneider 1989, WHO 1992) that readily spread among congested and impoverished commTunities; these communities are expected often to become all the more congested and impoverished through bearing the extra burden of refugees in large numbers. Thus, there could be prime conditions in which otherwise containable diseases could become pandemics.
These illustrations of synergistic interactions among environmental and other factors serve to point up the many amplified problems of a globally warmed world. In the face of these multifarious and multiplying problems, some communities and countries will probably be able to adapt, others probably not. The degree of probability remains a matter of judgement as long as we have scant quantified understanding of synergisms-a lacuna demonstrated by the fact that few of the previous analyses even mention the phenomenon, let alone the growing prospect, of multiple positive feedbacks in a greenhouse-affected world.
For purposes of this article's assessment, moreover, people who will be at risk of global-warming problems are considered thereby to become probable if not certain refugees. Some observers may respond that this assumption makes the current analysis a worst-case affair. I believe it is rather a real-world appraisal based largely on center-range estimates, albeit in a situation attended by abundant uncertainties.
In turn, a key question is raised about scientific uncertainties, with particular respect to policy responses. What is legitimate caution in the face of uncertainty, especially insofar as uncertainty can cut both ways? Some scientists may object that in the absence of conclusive evidence and analysis, it is better to stick with low estimates of refugee numbers on the grounds that they are more responsible. But note the crucial factor of asymmetry of evaluation. A low estimate, ostensibly safe because it takes a conservative view of such limited evidence as is at hand in documented detail, may fail to reflect the real situation just as much as does an unduly high estimate that is more of a best-judgement affair based on all available evidence with varying degrees of demonstrable validity.
A minimalist calculation with apparently greater precision may amount to spurious accuracy. In a situation of uncertainty in which not all factors can be quantified to conventional satisfaction, let us not become preoccupied with what can be precisely counted if that is to the detriment of what basically counts. Undue caution can become recklessness; and as in other situations beset with uncertainty, it will be better for us to find we have been roughly right than precisely wrong (Myers in press).
Aggregate assessment
The total of environmental refugees as calculated here for a greenhouseaffected world is approximately 150 million (Table 1) . However rough the reckoning, it supplies an initial insight into the scale of a major emergent problem.
This total amounts to 1.5% of the 10 billion people projected for the world's population in 2050. In contrast, the current 10 million recognized environmental refugees comprise only 0.2% of the global population of 5.5 billion.
Economic, sociocultural, and political consequences
The consequences of large numbers of environmental refugees would be among the most significant of all upheavals entrained by global warming.
Refugees arrive with what are often perceived by host communities as alien customs, religious practices, and di-etary habits, plus new pathogens and susceptibility to local pathogens. Resettlement is generally difficult, full assimilation is rare. Economic and social upheavals would proliferate, cultural and ethnic problems would multiply, and the political fallout would be extensive.
We are familiar enough with the strains generated for receiver nations today when they have to face throngs of refugees fleeing from drought, famine, floods, and other disasters (Chambers 1986). To quote a former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Prince Saddrudhin Aga Khan, "People flee their homes in search of food or jobs....As the victims move, they carry their famine with them, much as they might carry an infectious disease. They impose intolerable burdens in terms of food requirements on the territory they enter. At the same time, they flood the labor market, creating a slump in wages, and endangering the economic security of the local population. Fuse the two elements, and you have a perfect recipe for widespread human suffering, social disorder and political instability."
It already costs developed nations $8 billion a year to accommodate refugees. This amount is equivalent to a full one seventh of the foreign aid they supply to developing nations. It would serve as a handsome payoff investment to boost foreign aid and tackle more of the refugee problem at the source rather to than wait and pay a higher price through responding to symptoms of the same problem.
Yet, our experience to date offers scant guidance to what could lie ahead concerning costs. As a result of sealevel rise, coastal protection costs worldwide could be on the order of $2.5 trillion to $5.0 trillion, and coastal land loss $15 trillion, making a total of $17.5 trillion to $20 trillion, spread over a period of 50 years (Ayres and Walter 1991; see also Cline 1992, Fankhauser 1992, Nordhaus 1991). The gross world product today is approximately $23 trillion. No estimate is available of the costs of disrupted agriculture in drought-afflicted regions. They could be considerable given the projected food-deficit estimates.
But the refugee reckoning should be expanded to reflect a host of other costs. There would be support costs for maintenance and resettlement. Refugees could probably not make a contribution to their host communities' economies for at least a year or two, a sizable opportunity cost. Many other indirect costs would be sizable and hard if not impossible to estimate in conventional quantified terms. There would often be little land available to accommodate refugees, notably in regions with two or three times as many people as today. Refugees would tend to crowd into settlement camps or shantytowns, which would become prime breeding grounds for crime, civil disorder, social upheaval, and violence of many sorts (Ayres and Walter 1991). As a result, there could be soaring costs to maintain security, both internal and external (Myers 1993 ).
There could also be substantial outlays to counter pandemic diseases, plus deficits of food, water, and energy, together with the additional social strife and political turmoil that all these would entrain. It could often be the case that social disintegration would arrive sooner and on a larger scale than environmental breakdown. As Cline (1992) put it, "People have often fought wars to avoid being forced to leave their homelands." Moreover, these problems would often interact in such a way as to generate synergized outcomes, pushing the overall economic cost far beyond what we can realistically envisage in the light of our experience to date.
When we accord due attention to all the factors we can recognize today, plus those with which we are not yet acquainted but that may well emerge in a world altogether beyond our experience, we could suppose that the ultimate additional costs of environmental refugees could match or exceed the costs of easily identifiable and readily quantifiable problems, such as coastal protection measures and coastal land loss. As yet, we have no way of grasping what these further costs could be. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that because we cannot even identify all these costs, let alone define, assess, and quantify them, they should therefore be left out of the current account. The issue warrants urgent research from both natural-science and socialscience standpoints.
Conclusions
Today, refugees are viewed as a peripheral concern, a kind of aberration from the normal order of things. In a greenhouse-affected world of the future, they are likely to become a prominent feature of our one-Earth landscape due to the burgeoning phenomenon of environmental displacement. It requires a leap of the imagination to envisage 150 million destitutes abandoning their homelands, many of them crossing international borders. They would be all the more disruptive in a world struggling to cope with a plethora of environmental problems. Yet, amid discussions of global warming and its impacts, we hear all too little about environmental refugees.
